Moreover, the most correspondence on which the defendant relies is, at best, ambiguous and does not reflect the consent to general release sought by the defendant, with the exception of the defendant`s notification of such an exemption, for the sole purpose of being rejected by the applicant. Indeed, in this case, the defendant attempts to go far beyond the attempt to impose a rudimentary provision that abandons the applicant`s application, albeit with prejudice. On the contrary, the defendant attempts to assert an alleged agreement that would exempt the defendant, as well as his subsidies and related undertakings, from liability to the applicant for any potential claim or claim that has been formed from the beginning of time until today, and this in a restricted civil court. In these circumstances, the defendant should bear an even greater burden of proof of the existence of a particular agreement and invoke a compelling reason to relax the terms of Rule 2104. The defendant did not do so. Most courts will not blindly lend their imprimatur to agreed approval decrees (for example. (b) the imposition of non-monetary bonds in the future), since the application may infringe the rights of third parties or be otherwise unfair. The court will know the context of an approval order and will insist on deciding whether the order is a decision that the court would approve.5 The criteria that apply to decide whether a proposed approval order should be approved and introduced apply if it is “fair, appropriate and appropriate and consistent with the public interest.” 6 The court cannot amend an approval order. It must approve or reject the decree as presented7 Other courts, including the Second Division, have also done so where there is not, as in Bonnette, an objectively verifiable judicial record of the essential conditions of the settlement provision.
See z.B., Kalomiris v. Nassau County, 121 AD2d 367, 368 (2d Dept. 1986) (“[D]ie agreement reached in open court must have certain conditions and at least be entered within minutes of such proceedings . . . [D]d is not sufficient to satisfy CPLR 2104 on the administrator`s docket map indicating that the matter has been settled in itself.” Phillips v.